'What is it like to have ME?' The discursive construction of ME in computer-mediated communication and face-to-face interaction by Guise, Jennifer et al.
www.ssoar.info
'What is it like to have ME?' The discursive
construction of ME in computer-mediated
communication and face-to-face interaction
Guise, Jennifer; Widdicombe, Sue; McKinlay, Andy
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Guise, J., Widdicombe, S., & McKinlay, A. (2007). 'What is it like to have ME?' The discursive construction
of ME in computer-mediated communication and face-to-face interaction. Health, 11(1), 87-108. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1363459307070806
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-226102
Guise et al.: ‘What is it like to have ME?’health: An Interdisciplin ry Journal
for the Social Study of Health,
Illness and Medicine
Copyright © 2007 SAGE Publications
(London
Vol 11(1): 87–108‘What is it like to have 
ME?’: The discursive 
construction of ME in 
computer-mediated 
communication and face-
to-face interactiona d d r e s s  Jennifer Guise, Tayside Institute f
of Abertay, Dundee, Dudhope Castle, Barrack 
[E-mail: J.Guise@abertay.ac.uk]
Introduction
ME (Myalgic Encephalomyelitis) is the preferre
for a condition clinically referred to as chronic fa, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi)
DOI: 10.1177/1363459307070806Jennifer Guise, Sue Widdicombe and Andy McKinlay
University of Abertay, Dundee, UK, University of Edinburgh, UK and 
University of Edinburgh, UKa b s t r a c t  ME (Myalgic Encephalomyelitis) or CFS (chronic fatigue synd-
rome) is a debilitating illness for which no cause or medical tests have been 
identifi ed. Debates over its nature have generated interest from qualitative 
researchers. However, participants are diffi cult to recruit because of the nature 
of their condition. Therefore, this study explores the utility of the internet as 
a means of eliciting accounts. We analyse data from focus groups and the 
internet in order to ascertain the extent to which previous research fi ndings 
apply to the internet domain. Interviews were conducted among 49 members 
of internet groups (38 chatline, 11 personal) and 7 members of two face-to-face 
support groups. Discourse analysis of descriptions and accounts of ME or CFS 
revealed similar devices and interactional concerns in both internet and face-
to-face communication. Participants constructed their condition as serious, 
enigmatic and not psychological. These functioned to defl ect problematic 
assumptions about ME or CFS and to manage their accountability for the 
illness and its effects.k e y w o r d s  computer-mediated communication (CMC); discursive psycho-
logy; illness descriptions; ME/CFS87
or Health Studies, University 
Road, Dundee DD3 6HF, UK. 
d term among UK sufferers 
tigue syndrome (CFS). This 
88
health: 11(1)
illness affects between 110,000 and 150,000 people per annum in the UK 
(Cooper, 1997; Levine, 1997). It is often highly debilitating and yet it remains 
a controversial and problematic illness for both clinicians and patients. This 
is in part because, despite extensive investigation, no clear cause has been 
established (Fukuda et al., 1994; Wessely et al., 1998), and no unambiguous 
diagnostic medical tests identifi ed. Instead, ME or CFS is diagnosed on the 
basis of reported symptoms, and these can vary in nature and in intensity 
from one person to another. They may include reports of persisting or 
relapsing fatigue lasting six months or more; sore throat; tender lymph nodes; 
joint and muscle pain; headaches; post-exertion malaise; sleep disorder; and 
impaired memory or concentration (Fukuda et al., 1994; Holmes et al., 1988; 
Schluederberg et al., 1992; Sharpe et al., 1991).
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the causes and ‘objective’ diagnosis of 
ME or CFS, there have been debates over the extent to which psychological 
or psychiatric problems contribute to this condition (for example, in 
offi cial statements about this illness: Campion, 1998; Horton, 1996; Royal 
College of Physicians, 1996). At the same time, the medical account of the 
illness has been challenged by patient organizations such as the ME/CFS 
Alliance (Banks and Prior, 2001) in favour of their own experience-based 
explanations (for brief summaries of these controversies, see Horton-
Salway, 2001; Tucker, 2004).
The contested nature of ME/CFS has also generated interest from 
qualitative researchers interested in the effects of this uncertainty. Three 
issues in particular have been pursued:
1. Variability in the meaning and construction of ME/CFS;
2. warranting knowledge claims about ME/CFS; and
3. dealing with the implication that sufferers may have a psychological rather 
than physical illness.
In relation to the fi rst issue, Bülow and Hydén (2003) identifi ed at least three 
‘interpretative frameworks’ that were used often simultaneously by patients, 
nurses and physicians in the patient school they studied. These included 
biomedical, biopsychosocial and non-medical or everyday explanations 
of the illness. Banks and Prior (2001) noted the use of similar accounts of 
the illness in their study of medical consultations. Their concern, however, 
was more specifi cally with the confl ict between lay (biomedical) versus 
professional (biopsychosocial) accounts. They argued that consultations 
can become almost a political contest as different parties seek to defi ne the 
‘true’ nature of the disorder.
Horton-Salway (2004), however, questioned the implied distinction bet-
ween lay and expert knowledge because it rests on the assumption that there 
are discrete and identifi able forms of knowledge. She argued that ‘it should 
be the local production of expertise and experience and the legitimacy 
of related claims that is the focus of interest’ (2004: 354). Thus, Horton-
Salway’s (2004) analysis focused on the second issue, that is, how a clinical 
psychologist and sufferers establish their entitlement to make authoritative 
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claims about ME. She showed that they do so in part by making relevant their 
membership of particular categories (as, respectively, expert in psychological 
intervention and sufferers with a wealth of experience). She showed how 
expertise and experience were treated as forms of knowledge that added 
credibility to a speaker’s account or undermined others’ accounts. Similarly 
Tucker (2004) examined how sufferers constructed ME/CFS as a knowable, 
legitimate illness by drawing a contrast between a specialist doctor who can 
produce a correct diagnosis and ‘ordinary’ GPs who lack knowledge of and 
therefore the ability to recognize ME or CFS in sufferers.
Other work has examined how participants employ conversational 
strategies such as the use of medical terms and corroborative evidence 
(Horton-Salway, 2001; Tucker, 2004) to establish the factual status of 
their claims that ME/CFS is a physical and therefore legitimate illness. In 
addition, Bülow and Hydén (Bülow, 2004; Bülow and Hydén, 2003) show 
how sufferers deal with the problem of legitimacy by co-constructing 
consensual views (for example, in support groups) against which personal 
experience is compared. In this way, the group experience is used to validate 
individuals’ experiences.
A third issue concerns the inferential consequences of the questioned 
legitimacy of ME/CFS, in particular, the idea that it is primarily psychologi-
cal (that is, related to depression, anxiety and psychiatric illness) (Banks 
and Prior, 2001; Horton-Salway, 2004) and therefore not real (Banks and 
Prior, 2001). For example, it may be inferred that sufferers are simply 
malingering (Horton-Salway, 2001) or they may be stigmatized because it 
is more socially acceptable to suffer physical illness (Tucker, 2004). All of 
these assumptions have negative implications for the kind of person one 
is taken to be, and they therefore constitute a threat to identity. The third 
strand of work has therefore focused on how sufferers deal with these 
problematic inferences. Some of these identity problems are dealt with 
through establishing the legitimacy and veracity of ME/CFS (as above). 
However, sufferers may also produce attributions for the onset of the 
illness (for example, catching ’fl u), which simultaneously attend to their 
accountability for having it (Tucker, 2004; see also Horton-Salway, 2001). 
They also address negative identities directly, for example by constructing 
themselves as previously very active, thereby defl ecting the possible 
inference that they are lazy or depressed (Horton-Salway, 2001). Finally, 
Banks and Prior show how physicians may be sensitive to these problems 
and deal with them by ‘by-pass[ing] psychological language’ (2001: 20) and 
using instead the vocabulary of brain chemicals (such as serotonin) which 
in turn opens the possibility of prescribing anti-depressants without talk 
of depression.
Previous studies have revealed some of the ways in which the talk of 
clinicians and sufferers is sensitive to a number of interactional and inferential 
issues. The data have been derived from face-to-face interaction in interviews 
(Bülow, 2004; Bülow and Hydén, 2003; Horton-Salway, 2001; Tucker, 2004) 
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and recordings of meetings among members of a support group (Horton-
Salway, 2004) or patient school (Bülow, 2004; Bülow and Hydén, 2003). 
However, none of the previous studies in this area have attended to the way 
in which the internet provides a domain for interactions and support among 
sufferers. Yet, internet communication offers a valuable resource for ME 
sufferers, as for others who are chronically ill (Hardy, 1999) or who have 
incapacitating physical or speech diffi culties (Bowker and Tuffi n, 2004). It 
is therefore imperative that researchers engage with these new forms of 
communication especially in regard to this client group. Moreover, recent 
years have seen a growth in internet mediated support groups and there is 
evidence that the use of the internet for purposes of this sort is likely to 
increase (Nettleton and Burrows, 2003).
This study therefore recruited participants from an internet support 
site. There are, moreover, further benefi ts to be derived from the use of 
the internet as a medium for conducting research in this area. First, it is 
worthwhile noting that a number of previous studies of this sufferer group 
have engaged with relatively small participant samples. An added advantage 
of attending to the rise of internet-based communication is that researchers 
in this area are given greater opportunities to recruit from a wider range 
of participants. Second, it has the advantage of enabling participants to 
respond where and when they feel most comfortable and rested, and to 
break off and resume the interview as necessary. Similar advantages have 
been described for telephone interviewing (Clarke and James, 2003).
Thus, it seems that the internet is a useful medium for research but we 
fi rst need to ask how it relates to the kind of talk generated in face-to-face 
communication that has formed the data for previous research. In other 
words, we need to address the extent to which fi ndings from previous 
research carry over into the internet domain and computer-mediated 
communication (CMC). In particular, previous researchers’ interests have 
been in understanding the attributional and inferential properties of talk 
about ME. It is therefore crucial to understand the extent to which their 
fi ndings, which relate to face-to-face interaction, are relevant to sufferers’ 
‘talk’ on the internet. It is to this novel enterprise that this current article is 
addressed.
In addressing these concerns, it is useful to note that researchers in other 
areas have already demonstrated the ways in which CMC refl ects properties 
which are similar to spoken communication. Yates (2001) found that the 
range of vocabulary used in CMC resembled oral vocabulary rather than 
written communication in terms of the more limited variance in words used. 
Fernback (2003) also concluded that CMC is a site of oral culture, although 
one that undoubtedly possesses print characteristics. Other work has addre-
ssed the functional properties of CMC language use. For example, Antaki 
et al., (2005) and Lamerichs and te Molder (2003) show how internet 
users, like participants in conversation, attend to issues of accountability in 
postings. These studies call into question the assumption of earlier research, 
91
Guise et al.: ‘What is it like to have ME?’
that CMC is an impoverished or somehow different form of communication 
(for example Rutter, 1984; Short et al., 1976). Therefore, we cannot assume 
a priori that CMC changes human interaction in specifi c ways, or that the 
infl uence is only in one direction; instead, this must be an empirical issue 
(Hutchby, 2001a, 2001b). It is therefore important that we collect data from 
both face-to-face and internet sources.
The present study
In this study, sufferers’ accounts of having ME/CFS were collected through 
internet and face-to-face discussion groups. Our aim was to examine in detail 
how sufferers’ descriptions are constructed and, if relevant, to identify the 
kinds of interactional and inferential issues that inform their production. 
The focus, on participants’ constructions of ME, was designed to ensure that 
our fi ndings would be comparable to those of previous studies.
Like previous studies, we assume that descriptions are not neutral 
accounts of some aspect of the way the world is which can be assessed for 
their accuracy. After all, phenomena may be described in many different 
but equally plausible ways. We therefore take it that people can and do 
use descriptions to perform actions (Potter, 1996), and that the action-
orientation of descriptions is achieved through the ways they are constructed 
(e.g. through the use of particular words or phrases). Moreover, they are 
usually produced in an interpersonal context and, given this, there is always 
the possibility that descriptions may be greeted with scepticism (Hutchby 
and Wooffi tt, 1998). For example, they may be treated as a product of the 
person’s own interests, desires or ambitions, and discounted on this basis 
as interested rather than neutral (Edwards and Potter, 1992). Descriptions 
are therefore often designed to deal with such diffi cult inferential issues. 
Therefore, our analysis will attend to questions of ‘how?’ and ‘what for?’ in 
participants’ constructions of ME.
Method
Data and participants
A total of 56 ME sufferers took part in this study. Data were collected 
from two sources: face-to-face group (FG) discussions and internet 
(e-mail) communication with members of ME support groups. The discus-
sion groups, which involved open-ended questions followed by discussion 
among the participants, were, like focus groups, participant-centred (Puchta 
and Potter, 2002). Internet data were collected either as part of a non-
synchronous (that is, not ‘real time’) web-based support group chatline, or 
via one-to-one e-mails.
Face-to-face group members were recruited by fi rst telephoning contacts 
for local ME support groups, then writing to their organizing committees 
and via them to individual members. The letters explained the purpose of 
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the study and stated that all data would be made anonymous and treated 
as confi dential. One meeting was held at a researcher’s house; the second 
meeting was held immediately after a support group session in a hospital 
seminar room. The purpose of the research was discussed with participants, 
and they were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any 
time. A total of seven participants were recruited in this way. Each meeting 
lasted approximately one hour. The data were recorded and transcribed 
using a modifi ed version of the widely used system developed by Jefferson 
(summarized by ten Have, 1999).
Internet respondents were recruited through a message posted on a 
web-based support group, providing the same information as described 
above. Members of the internet support group received all emails posted 
to the chatline; therefore their responses to the research questions were 
available for other members to read and comment on. This is referred to 
here as ‘Internet Chatline Communication’ (ICC), and 38 sufferers chose to 
respond on this basis. However, support group members were asked if they 
would prefer to communicate on a one-to-one basis so that responses would 
be private. This communication is referred to here as ‘Internet Personal 
Communication’ (IPC), and it involved a further 11 respondents. In the 
analysis below, the extracts are coded to indicate their source. All of the 
internet data are quoted with spelling, punctuation and all other features as 
in the original.
In our efforts to focus on participants’ concerns rather than imposing our 
own, all participants were asked a series of open, general and non-directive 
questions about their illness, how it affected them and how they dealt with 
it. This analysis focuses on the responses to questions in which participants 
were asked to describe ME and its impact on their lives.
Analytic procedure
Our methods are rooted in the theoretical assumptions that language has a 
social function and is a medium of social action (Edwards, 1977). Analysis 
therefore focuses on how it is that descriptions of ME are constructed, and 
the functions that such constructions might serve. We adopted the variety 
of discourse analysis developed in the context of discursive psychology and 
which draws on insights from conversation analysis (see Wooffi tt, 2005) 
because it is best fi tted to our aims and the kind of data we had collected.
The term ‘discursive psychology’ was introduced in 1992 (Edwards and 
Potter, 1992) and originally indicated an emphasis on construction and 
the analysis of variability in talk. More recently, discursive psychology has 
laid a greater emphasis on the analysis of conversations (Edwards, 2000; 
Potter and Hepburn, 2003). Discursive psychology treats psychology as 
itself an object in interaction, and views psychology as a part of discourse 
(Potter, 2005). One key element in discursive psychology is that participants’ 
psychological concerns and categorizations are a topic of study only when 
they are embedded in interaction. In particular, discursive psychology is 
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interested in understanding the way in which speakers construct agency and 
accountability in what they say.
Discursive psychology developed from a particular interest in naturally 
occurring, everyday interactions. Our data were gathered for the specifi c 
purpose of examining sufferers’ descriptions of ME, by means of focus 
groups and one-to-one interviews. Attempts were made, however, to focus 
on participants’ concerns, for example, by using open and general questions, 
and thereafter refraining from directing the topic of ongoing discussion. 
Face-to-face group discussions provide a rich context in which participants 
respond to each other as well as the interviewer, and many features of 
everyday conversation are present. E-mail text, however, lacks certain 
features of oral communication such as pauses, turn-taking and self-repair.
Focus group methodology must be treated carefully within a discursive 
psychology framework (Edwards and Stokoe, 2004). Kitzinger (1994, 1995) 
has noted that a key advantage of using focus groups to gather data is that 
participants interact. This allows the turn-by-turn analysis of talk, to see how 
it is that speakers take up what has just been said, and how their response 
in turn shapes what might come next. Hutchby and Wooffi tt (1998) refer 
to this as ‘next turn proof procedure’. There is far less potential for such 
analysis in one-to-one interviews, where participants’ turns are extended 
and interaction is minimal. These data can still, however, be examined for 
conversational devices that have been identifi ed by previous researchers 
working in the tradition of discursive psychology, and examined for the 
possible functions they might have. For example, descriptions which are 
carefully designed to allow inferences to be drawn from them are potentially 
observable in written as well as verbal communication. Therefore, we treated 
data extracts as equivalent for the purposes of analysis. So our analysis was 
driven by an interest in the construction and function of accounts and not 
by a primary concern to identify differences in types of data (though we will 
discuss similarities and differences later).
With this in mind, the analytic process was as follows. First, transcripts 
were read through and inspected closely to identify recurrent patterns 
or features in the data. Preliminary collections of particular discursive 
phenomena were then compiled. These seemed to relate to constructions of 
ME as serious, enigmatic and not psychological. Next, the analysis of these 
broadly identifi ed constructions was facilitated by what Edwards (1997) 
refers to as the ‘could-have-been-otherwise’ quality of talk. This means that 
every detail of what is said or written is treated as potentially signifi cant 
because it was said or written in that particular way and at that particular 
time. In addition, the analysis was guided by three action-oriented properties 
of talk: fi rst, to identify the action(s) being accomplished; second to relate 
the actions identifi ed back to the text to see that participants did indeed 
orient to the action(s) as described by the analyst; and third, to see how the 
detail of what was said produced the action(s) in question. In the analysis 
that follows, we identify and explicate devices that were used to build and 
warrant various constructions of ME and the actions accomplished.
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Analysis
Constructions of ME as a serious illness
In the following extract, Billy responds to the question, ‘how would you 
describe having ME to someone who doesn’t know anything about it?’. Of 
course, the local context in which this question is posed is one in which Billy 
is being invited by the interviewer to provide a description of ME. However, 
the analytic point of interest here is to examine the way in which Billy 
produces this description and the social actions to which this description 
orients.
Extract 1 MEICCp58 Billy
 30 […] The alcohol intolerance. (you look to others like you’re a
 31 chronic alcoholic and you haven’t had, or desired, a drink in six
 32 months). The IBS [Irritable Bowel Syndrome]. The memory loss.
 33 Concentration gone. Can’t absorb anything read. Emotional IQ
 34 completely zeroed out. Fuzzy vision – it looks as if you’re looking at a
 35 two-dimensional screen, the 3D effect goes and the focus is diffi cult.
 36 Vertigo or giddiness – things don’t look steady. Odd attacks of
 37 unaccountable backache or joint pain that may last days, weeks, then
 38 just go. Can’t get to sleep normally; wake up much too early in the
 39 morning, so feel tired as a consequence. Night sweats. Muscles that
 40 ache or hurt after minor exercise, like turning the car.
An initial observation is that Billy’s description of ME allows the recipient to 
infer an assessment of the condition rather than stating it directly (as in ‘it’s 
awful because …’). Moreover, his description has several further interesting 
features. First, it has a list-like quality; that is, instead of describing one or 
two primary characteristics of his condition (such as extreme tiredness), 
he describes a number of symptoms and he does so using minimal phrases 
(for example, ‘Concentration gone’ rather than ‘My concentration is gone’). 
Second, he uses an analogy (‘it looks as if you’re looking at a two-dimensio-
nal screen’) to describe the impact of one symptom (‘fuzzy vision’). Third, 
he produces an example of an effect (‘muscles that ache or hurt’) and a 
cause (‘turning the car’) that are clearly disjunctive. We will explore each of 
these features in turn.
We noted above that Billy used listing as a device for constructing ME. A 
similar device can be observed in the following extracts. Moreover, like Billy, 
respondents in extracts 2 and 3 produce indirect assessments in response to 
the question.
Extract2 MEICCp17 Alex
   1  My sleep pattern has gone out of the window.
   2
   3  My muscles ache.
   4
   5  I’m not tired, I’m exhausted yet I haven’t moved off the sofa.
   6
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   7  I get 5 or 6 different types of headache.
   8
   9  My vision has deteriorated very quickly.
 10
 11  I start to talk and forget ... in mid sentence.
 12
 13  Oh, I must not forget I suffer from IBS [Irritable Bowel Syndrome].
Extract 3 FGME2
   1  Jennifer:  ↑how <would you describe> having ME to someone who
   2   doesn’t know anything about it?
   3  Rhona:  hhh unbelievable=
   4   Liz: =aye
   5  Rhona:  e::m tiredness (..) <you get ↑switched off>
   6  Liz: °aye°
   7  Rhona: you can be sitting (.) no [not] even doing anything=
   8  Jennifer: =mm=
   9  Rhona: =and it’s like somebody (..) switches you ↓off and you
 10   have ↓got to lie down (..) or you you fall asleep [unclear]
 11  Liz: °your brain doesnae work properly either°
 12  Jennifer: mhmm=
 13  Rhona:  =fuzzy head
 14  Liz: °aye°
 15  Rhona:  muscle and (.) joint pain
We have already noted how Billy uses minimal phrases and sentences that 
lack part of a verb or a pronoun to ‘do a list’. For example, ‘Concentration 
gone. Can’t absorb anything read. Emotional IQ completely zeroed out’ 
(lines 33–34). In extract 2, Alex leaves a blank line between each symptom 
description, so that his account of ME gives the visual impression of a list. 
In extract 3, which comes from a face-to-face group rather than internet 
communication (as extracts 1 and 2), we see how participants collaborate 
to work up a listing. For example, in lines 5 – 9, Rhona says ‘tiredness (..) 
you get switched off …’, and Liz follows with ‘your brain doesnae work 
properly either’ (line 11). Indeed, by the end of the list, they employ minimal 
descriptions (‘fuzzy head’; ‘muscle and joint pain’), which are similar to those 
we observed in the internet extracts. Moreover, they use them to similar 
effect, namely making their description hearable as a list.
The lists produced make relevant a range of characteristics: concentration 
and memory problems, visual problems, IBS, muscular and joint pain, 
headaches and tiredness. They thereby allow the recipient to infer that the 
effects of ME are extensive.
A second feature of Billy’s (extract 1) description that we noted was 
his use of analogy. A similar device can be seen in the next three extracts. 
As was the case with the earlier extracts, the following three responses are 
produced by participants in reply to a question, ‘how would you describe 
having ME to someone who doesn’t know anything about it?’. Once again 
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the analytic point of interest here is the way in which sufferers’ descriptions 
are constructed here-and-now, given the potential range of ways that they 
could have answered the question. In the following three descriptions 
participants accomplish an answer to the question through analogy, and, 
as in extracts 1 to 3, they thereby produce an indirect assessment of their 
condition.
Extract 4  FGME1
   3  Mandy:  there ↑is a defi nition that I’ve read of the (.) ME Action if
   4    you i↑mag↓ine (.) that you’ve got (.) ↓↑severe ’fl u (.)
   5  Claire:   mhmm
   6  Mandy  you’ve got a hangover (.)
   7  Jennifer:  mhmm=
   8  Mandy:  =so you’ve got the tummy and the head
   9  Jennifer:  yeah=
 10  Mandy:  =and all the ’fl u aches and pains (.) and then (.) if you
 11    imagine you’ve just run a marathon (.)
 12  Jennifer:  mhmm
 13  Mandy:  you <↑put all those together> and you have ME
Extract 5 MEICCp1 Lynn
   4  Remember your worst fl u virus you had,now run a marathon,on top of
   5  that you have a migrain ,feel dizzy,hurt from head to toe. Try to play
   6  chessblindfolded, and havent slept for a week.Wake up feeling ok,,,,15
   7  minutes later are unable to even get out of bed with out help,every
   8  muscleand joint feels like its on fi re,and suddely fi nd out you become
   9  dyxlexic, Im sure there are other things ive forgotten.
Extract 6 MEICCp1 Emily
   9  I usually tell my friends that I feel like I have been out all night
 10  drinking pints of vodka & tequilla slammers and then forced to run a
 11  marathon on top of a dose of fl u.
In extracts 4 to 6, participants respond to the question of what it is like to 
have ME by producing a set of activities or experiences which we are told 
are analogous to having ME. There are several interesting features of the 
way these analogies are constructed. First, they invite the reader or listener 
to imagine a particular state of affairs: ‘if you imagine (.) that you’ve got 
(.) severe ’fl u’; ‘if you imagine you’ve just run a marathon’ (extract 4, lines 
4, 10 – 11). The respondent in extract 5 invites the reader to remember, 
rather than imagine, ‘your worst fl u virus you had’ (line 4). The things 
they invite the recipient to imagine include having ’fl u, having hangovers, 
and running marathons. It is therefore implied that these are potentially 
imaginable states of affairs for the reader or listener.
A second point is that respondents build their descriptions to portray 
exaggerated or severe cases of these imaginable experiences. So, for example, 
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we are invited to imagine ‘severe ’fl u’ (extract 4, line 4), or to remember the 
‘worst ’fl u virus’ (extract 5, line 4) and we are invited to imagine running a 
marathon or climbing Everest, and not exercise that might be assumed to 
be more commonplace, such as going running, taking exercise or climbing 
a hill. Similarly, in extract 6 Emily likens her feelings to being out ‘all night’ 
and the alcohol intake, the effects of which her friends are invited to imagine, 
is extreme. She describes drinking a mixture of strong spirits (vodka and 
tequila) by the pint. Pomerantz (1984) has shown that extreme case 
formulations, such as ‘worst fl u virus’, or ‘all night’ can be used to provide the 
strongest possible case for what is being said, in anticipation of a potentially 
cynical uptake.
Another way in which participants work up extreme or exaggerated forms 
of the experiences to which they refer is by juxtaposing them. In extract 4, 
Mandy has invited the listener to imagine ‘you’ve got (.) severe fl u … you’ve 
got a hangover … you’ve just run a marathon’. She then says ‘you put all 
those together and you have ME’. In extract 5, the reader is invited to think 
about having ’fl u, ‘now run a marathon,on top of that you have a migrain,feel 
dizzy, hurt from head to toe’. Again, her description makes relevant the 
concurrence of diffi cult or unpleasant states of affairs. Emily implies the 
juxtaposition of having a hangover, and being ‘forced to run a marathon on 
top of a dose of fl u’.
So far, we have noted that participants employ analogies in their 
descriptions of ME. In using these analogies, they appeal to readers’ or 
listeners’ experiences, or imaginable states of affairs. At the same time, 
we have observed the use of several descriptive devices through which 
respondents portray extreme or exaggerated forms of these imaginable 
experiences. In this way, respondents are able to invite empathy (by drawing 
on potentially common experiences) while simultaneously portraying the 
severity of ME.
A third feature of extract 1 we noted above was the way Billy’s description 
of an effect of ME (‘muscles that ache or hurt’) was apparently unwarranted 
by the attributed cause (‘turning the car’). A similar descriptive device is 
employed in the following extracts.
Extract 7 MEIPCp2 Dorothy
  24  Holding a pen or a book become thing to be proud of;-)
  25  Reading becomes something you can do only in short stints. Walking
  26  becomes a trial.
Extract 8 MEICCp13 Lesley
  57  standing is one of the most dangerous things one can do.
Extract 9 FGME2
816  Rhona:  if I ↑stand for long ↑peri↑ods (.) <I don’t know about
817    you>
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818 Liz:  °terrible°
819 Rhona:  that ↑kills↓you
820 Liz:   terrible
In these extracts, participants describe an activity which they then claim 
is in some way challenging, for example, ‘Holding a pen or a book’ and 
‘reading’ (extract 7), ‘standing’ (extract 8), and ‘stand[ing] for long periods’ 
(extract 9). The kinds of activities they describe are mundane, ordinary 
activities, the sorts of things that everybody might do, and the kinds of 
activities that are physically relatively undemanding.
They then produce an assessment of that activity. So, holding a pen or 
book is described as ‘[a] thing to be proud of’ (extract 7), walking is ‘a trial’ 
(extract 7) and standing is ‘one of the most dangerous things one can do’ 
(extract 8). In extract 9, participants collaborate to produce their assessment 
of standing as very diffi cult. In line 818, Liz evaluates standing for long 
periods as ‘terrible’, while Rhona’s comment is ‘that kills you’ (line 819) 
and Liz affi rms that assessment by saying ‘terrible’ again. These assessments 
emphasize the exceptional nature (pride in holding a pen) or exceptional 
diffi culty in carrying out the mundane activities made relevant. There is 
therefore a disjunction between the activity and efforts necessary to achieve 
it: the diffi culty or pride is not merited by the activity described. In other 
words, participants make an implicit contrast between the diffi culties they 
have, and the kinds of straightforward, physically undemanding tasks that 
give rise to these diffi culties.
A further notable feature of participants’ descriptions relates to their 
use of pronouns. In eight of the ten extracts examined above, participants 
used the second person plural when describing what it is like to have ME. 
For example, in extract 3, Rhona states ‘you can be sitting [...] and it’s like 
somebody switches you off or you fall asleep’ and Liz claims ‘your brain 
doesnae work properly either’ (lines 5 – 11). Similarly, in extract 4 (line 3 
onwards) the recipient is invited to imagine ‘that you’ve got (.) severe’ 
fl u (.) [...] you’ve got a hangover’ and so on. The use of ‘you’ rather than the 
apparently more appropriate pronoun ‘I’ has the effect of implying generality 
of symptoms. That is, it is inferred that these symptoms characterize ME in 
general, they are not specifi c to the individual describing them. In this way, 
respondents avoid personalizing their accounts.
A related observation is that in extract 1, Billy omits a pronoun altogether 
even though he is describing symptoms that are quite specifi c and so might 
reasonably be considered to relate to personal experience. He writes ‘[c]an’t 
get to sleep normally; wake up much too early in the morning, […] Night 
sweats.’ (lines 38 – 39). In other places, Billy makes repeated use of the defi nite 
article where it would usually be left out – ‘[t]he alcohol intolerance’ (line 30); 
‘[t]he IBS’ (line 32); ‘[t]he memory loss’ (line 32). Again, the effect is to 
suggest that these are symptoms that are generally associated with ME.
There is an interesting exception to this pattern. In extract 9 above, Rhona 
uses the fi rst person singular pronoun. She says ‘if I stand for long periods’ 
(lines 816 – 819). But there follows a short pause, and an insertion clause in 
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which she explicitly seeks some sort of collaboration regarding the effects 
of standing – ‘I don’t know about you’. Liz takes this up as an invitation to 
provide an assessment, but does so selectively, in that she does not refer to 
her own experience. Instead, she uses no pronoun at all: ‘terrible’. Similarly, 
in Rhona’s turn that follows, her claim is general rather than personal: ‘that 
kills you’. In this case then, initial fi rst person is changed and participants use 
the pronoun ‘you’ to suggest general features of ME and to avoid suggesting 
an individual, or psychological, basis for ME.
Constructions of ME as an enigmatic illness
There is a further feature of the extracts above that we wish to examine; in 
particular, the ways respondents build up the condition as puzzling in one 
or both of two ways. One is through the use of terms such as ‘odd’, and the 
other is through the use of contrasting states of affairs.
Extract 10 MEICCp26 George
   3  You feel profoundly tired physically and mentally for no good reason.
   4  You get odd aches and pains
Extract 11 (also 5) MEICCp1 Lynn (for ease of reference, the 
original extract number appears in brackets)
   6  Wake up feeling ok,,,,15
   7  minutes later are unable to even get out of bed with out help
Extract 12 (also 2) MEICCp17 Alex
   5  I’m not tired, I’m exhausted yet I haven’t moved off the sofa.
Extract 13 (also 1) MEICCp58 Billy
  36  Vertigo or giddiness – things don’t look steady. Odd attacks of
  37  unaccountable backache or joint pain that may last days, weeks, then
  38  just go.
Extract 14 (also 3) FGME2
   7  Rhona:   you can be sitting (.) no [not] even doing anything=
   8  Jennifer:   mm=
   9  Rhona:   =and it’s like somebody (..) switches you ↓off and you
  10     have ↓got to lie down (..) or you you fall asleep [unclear]
  11  Liz:   °your brain doesnae work properly either°
     [...]
  29  Liz:    em (.) it’s just a weird weird thing <it’s no> [not] one thing
  30     and <it’s no [not] one thing>(..) two days in a row
In extract 10,  George writes that  ‘[y]ou get odd aches and pains’ (line 4;  empha-
sis added) and in extract 13, Billy writes about ‘[o]dd attacks of unaccountable 
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backache or joint pain’ (lines 36–38; emphasis added). In extract 14, Liz makes 
the claim ‘em (.) it’s just a weird weird thing’ (Line 29; emphasis added). In 
this way, they are able to introduce unpleasant symptoms and simultaneously 
suggest that they are inexplicable; in other words, it is implied that they do 
not have a specifi able precursor. Liz reinforces her characterization of ME as 
‘weird’ by implying that its symptoms are unpredictable from day to day (‘it’s 
no one thing and it’s no one thing (..) two days in a row’ (lines 29–30).
A second observation concerns the use of contrasts. For example, Lynn uses 
the following contrast formulation: ‘[w]ake up feeling ok,,,,[sic]15 minutes 
later are unable to even get out of bed with out help’ (extract 11, lines 6–7). 
In extract 12, Alex writes ‘I’m not tired, I’m exhausted yet I haven’t moved 
off the sofa’ (line 5). Similarly, in extract 14, Rhona contrasts ‘sitting (.) no 
even doing anything [...]’ with ‘it’s like somebody (..) switches you off and you 
have got to lie down’ (lines 7–10). In each case, one state of affairs (feeling 
OK, being on the sofa, sitting not doing anything) is contrasted with another 
state of affairs characterized as debilitating (being unable to get out of bed 
on one’s own, feeling exhausted, having to lie down). These descriptions are 
designed to allow the recipient to draw certain inferences; in particular these 
are not accidental conjunctions. Instead, there is portrayed an unexpected 
relation between the two states of affairs. That is, Lynn conjoins ‘wake up 
feeling ok’ with her state ‘15 minutes later’; Alex signals the contrast between 
his previous state of inactivity and the exhaustion that he reports with the 
term ‘yet’. Rhona characterizes the change from ‘doing nothing’ to ‘having to 
lie down’ as abrupt through the use of the simile ‘somebody switches you off’.
These descriptive devices portray the symptoms attributed to ME as 
puzzling and imply that there is no rational basis for the problems sufferers 
claim to experience. This is made more explicit in George’s description, ‘you 
feel profoundly tired physically and mentally for no good reason’ (emphasis 
added) and in Billy’s characterization of backache as ‘unaccountable’ and 
something that after days or weeks ‘then just go[es]’ (which draws attention 
to the lack of imputed reason for their disappearance). In addition, by 
constructing the basis of symptoms as irrational, participants are also able 
to make available the inference that it is not something they have done 
that has led to the debilitating effects they describe. This can be inferred 
from the nature of activities to which they refer (not moving off the sofa 
or not even doing anything) and in Rhona’s characterization of somebody 
switching her off. Through passive inactivity and attributing switching off to 
external agency, participants imply that they are not personally accountable 
for their fatigue.
Constructions of ME as ‘not psychological’
In the following extracts, participants produce and deny claims about what 
ME is not. In extracts 15 and 16, respondents claim that ME is not depression, 
and in 17 that it is not laziness. These extracts occurred at various points in 
the transcripts and were not generated in immediate response to a particular 
question.
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Extract 15 FGME2
475 Liz:   a:nd I mean before I ↑went to the doctor (.) the last
476    time before I was ( ) diagnosed or ( ) <she agreed with
477    me> ( ) I did say to <my husband> ‘look (..) do ↑you think
478    it’s depression or do you think there’s something wrong
479    with me ( ) do you think (.) I’m <just making it> all ↑up or
480    whatever’ he says <‘no’ he says> ‘I live with you day to
481    day and (.) and ↑I know there is defi nitely something (.)
482    ↓wrong’
483 Jennifer:   mm=
484 Liz  =<it’s no [not] depression> I actually (.) suffered from 
    depression
     (.) years ago (.) a:nd so I knew it wasnae
     [wasn’t] depression
Extract 16 MEIPCp7 Dorothy
 29 I called my husbaband into the Drs surgery and told him in front of the
 30 Dr what his dx [diagnosis] was. My husband laughed and said that
 31 there was no way I was depressed and that as his fi eld of work was
 32 mental health he reckoned that he might have spotted the signs in his
 33 wife were they present.
Extract 17 FGME2
680 Liz: there was just=
681 Jennifer: mm=
682 Liz: nothing right about me and (.) I couldnae [couldn’t]
683  understand this wanting to sleep all the time (.) I’ve never
684  been late going to bed (..) but to go to bed during the day or fall
685  asleep in a ↑chair
686 Jennifer: [mmhmm
687 Rhona: mhmm]
688 Liz: ↓never (..) never (.) ehm (.…) and no [not] to ° ‘oh I cannae
689 Liz: be bothered’° when you ↑say ‘cannae be ↑both↑ered’ (.) it
690  sounds as if (.) <to me> ↑lazy
691 Rhona: °aye°
692 Jennifer: mhmm
693 Rhona: yeah
694 Liz: <it it’s> (..) you know it’s ↑no [not] lazy it’s (..) you just ( )
695  ↑havenae got the energy to ↑do it.h (.) and that’s what you
696  say <‘oh I cannae [can’t] be bothered doing that’> but it (.)
697  it’s ↑no [not] that it’s (.) you haven't got the energy to get
698  yourself ↑up out the chair (.) to ↑do ↓it (.) and (..) you just
699  cannae [can’t] fathom out what what’s going ↑on
In the fi rst part of these extracts, participants make relevant a potential 
diagnosis. Dorothy (extract 16) states indirectly that her condition may 
be seen as depression by giving an account of her husband’s receipt of the 
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doctor’s diagnosis (line 31). By contrast Liz (extract 15) introduces this 
description of her condition directly via reported speech (‘I did say to my 
husband “look (..) do you think it’s depression …”’). Liz describes one 
circumstance under which you might say ‘I cannae be bothered’ and states 
that this might be ascribed to laziness (‘it sounds as if (.) to me lazy’).
However, each participant then denies the potential diagnosis she has 
just produced. Liz produces the counterclaims ‘it’s no depression’ (line 484) 
and (line 694) ‘it’s no lazy’, while Dorothy quotes her husband who, she 
claims, said ‘there was no way I was depressed’ (line 31). Indeed, her account 
of his denial is preceded by the claim ‘[m]y husband laughed’. Laughter 
is a surprising reaction to a being told of a partner’s depression, and this 
description implies that such a diagnosis is not only wrong but risible.
These denials employ a number of devices to build the factual status 
of the counterclaim. For example, Liz and Dorothy make relevant their 
husbands as witness to their condition. Potter (1996) notes the usefulness 
of providing corroboration in rendering an account factual. Moreover, 
that they introduce ‘husband’ as corroborating their account further 
strengthens their claims. That is, Whalen and Zimmerman (1990) among 
others have noted that category entitlement can be used to warrant claims 
to knowledge, and in this case, someone in the category of a husband, could 
be assumed to have detailed knowledge of his wife’s mental state. Indeed, 
Liz makes explicitly relevant her husband’s close relationship with her: ‘I 
live with you day to day (.) and I know there is defi nitely something wrong’ 
(lines 480–82). Dorothy refers three times to their relationship as a married 
couple, referring to ‘husband’ twice and ‘the signs in his wife’ (lines 32–33; 
emphasis added). Dorothy’s account is particularly effective: she produces 
a second relevant category description of her husband, writing that ‘his fi eld 
of work was mental health’. The categorical claims are designed to make 
available certain inferences, which are made explicit here: ‘he reckoned 
that he might have spotted the signs in his wife were they present’. Thus, 
the husband’s credentials as a person with knowledge of depression, and as 
someone who has a close relationship with Dorothy, are used to expose the 
doctor’s diagnosis of depression as inaccurate.
It is worth noting that these statements about the respondent’s condition 
are portrayed as husbands’ observations. That is, Liz’s account in extract 15 
is produced in such a way that her question (‘I did say to my husband “look 
(..) do you think it’s depression or …”’) and his counterclaim (‘no … I live 
with you … and I know there is defi nitely something (.) wrong’) can be 
heard as reported speech (lines 477–79). Dorothy, in extract 17, uses indirect 
reported speech in lines 30–31 where she writes:  ‘[m]y husband laughed and 
said that there was no way I was depressed’. In all these cases, participants 
are using ‘active voicing’. Wooffi tt (1992) has shown that active voicing is 
used to construct the reality of the reported speech. Thus, when Liz quotes 
her husband, the account appears more convincing than if she had merely 
summarized what he had said in her own words.
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In extract 17, Liz uses a further device, specifi cally an appearance/reality 
formulation, to construct her incapacity as being due to lack of energy rather 
than laziness. Potter and Wetherell (1989) have shown how this formulation 
can help to construct the reality of what is being claimed. It involves 
setting up a version as the one that may appear to be obvious, then 
undermining it by producing the version that is ‘real’. Here, Liz makes the 
following contrast: she says ‘when you say “cannae be bothered” (.) it sounds 
as if (.) to me lazy [...] it it’s (..) you know it’s no lazy it’s (..) you just havenae 
got the energy to do it’ (lines 689 – 95). The appearance of ME is constructed 
as one in which the sufferer lacks the motivation to do something. With 
‘it sounds as if’, Liz orients to the interpretation that others might have of 
ME sufferers’ inactivity. Immediately after this, there is what seems to be 
a repair. That is, we might expect in the context something like ‘it sounds 
as if you’re being lazy’. What Liz does is to pause briefl y then say ‘to me 
lazy’. She therefore actively positions herself as a person who understands 
this assumption of a lack of motivation. This works to construct Liz herself 
as impartial, making the same initial assumptions that any other observer 
might have done. In turn, this construction helps to strengthen the reality 
claim that follows.
Discussion
We mentioned earlier that previous discursive research focused on the 
ways that sufferers deal with particular problematic assumptions about ME, 
including the ways that it is regarded as a psychological rather than a physical 
condition and that it is therefore somehow ‘not real’: it is just tiredness, 
laziness or, as one study found, ‘masked depression’ (Horton-Salway, 2004). 
Our work complements and extends these fi ndings by showing how various 
constructions of ME are designed to address further possibly damaging 
implications for the sufferer of claiming to have ME/CFS.
In the fi rst section of the analysis, we identifi ed several descriptive 
devices, which, we argued, worked to build the seriousness of ME in various 
ways. These included, fi rst, listing, which was used to portray ME as an 
accumulation of symptoms, and to claim an extensive range of problems. 
Second, vivid analogy with everyday experiences that cause debilitating 
tiredness (for example, having the ’fl u or running a marathon) was used to 
imply the severe impact of the illness. Third, by comparing ME symptoms 
to extreme forms of more everyday experiences, participants orient to 
the potential charge that their fatigue is similar to the kinds of tiredness 
commonly felt by other people, and is therefore not a serious condition. 
Their invitation to recipients to imagine these experiences functioned to 
evoke empathy. Fourth, participants produced an implicit contrast between 
mundane activities and the assessment of diffi culty in doing them, which 
further constructed their physical condition as serious. These descriptions 
enabled sufferers to defl ect the potential charge that their illness was 
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brought on by their previous levels of activity. This in turn can be seen 
as an orientation to the possible interpretation of ME as an illness of ‘high 
achievers’, brought on by an unusually active and demanding lifestyle (see 
also Horton-Salway, 2001, who makes a similar observation).
Finally, we observed a preference for the second person plural and noted 
that its use helps to avoid personalizing sufferers’ experiences, because it 
allows the recipient to infer that what is said is generally applicable. Bülow 
and Hydén (2003: 238) also showed that personal experiences were avoided, 
in part due to ‘a general assumption that personal stories about suffering 
do not belong in medical discourse’. Indeed, Åsbring and Närvänen (2003) 
showed that physicians in their study regarded symptoms as not serious (they 
can be lived with), they sometimes questioned patients’ morality (especially 
their work ethic), and categorized them as ambitious, active, illness-fi xated 
and so on. The orientation of sufferers to the issues we have identifi ed is 
therefore not surprising.
In the second section, we showed how participants used several linguistic 
devices (descriptive terms and contrast) to portray their illness as enigmatic 
and to imply the non-rational and unpredictable status of their symptoms. 
This allowed them to emphasize their passive role in developing symptoms, 
and implied that they were not responsible for developing ME/CFS. So, 
whereas Tucker (2004) showed how issues of responsibility and blame were 
dealt with through constructions of ME as an organic illness, our analysis 
reveals a further way of dealing with issues of accountability.
In the third section, we showed how participants’ accounts were designed 
to warrant what ME/CFS is not. Corroboration, category entitlements, 
appearance/reality formulations (Potter and Wetherell, 1989) and active 
voicing (Wooffi tt, 1992) of ‘reliable witness’ testimony were used to build 
the factual status of their claims that ME/CFS is not laziness, nor is it 
depression. By making relevant and then denying these meanings of ME/
CFS, participants were better able to orient to and then reject explicitly the 
kinds of assumptions that are made about the illness. Horton-Salway (2001) 
and Tucker (2004) note sufferers’ use of similar devices (corroboration 
and active voicing) to claim their illness is physical, and reject its assumed 
status as psychological.
Our concern in this paper was not to categorize the nature of respondents’ 
beliefs regarding the causes or explanations for having ME, but simply 
to analyse accounts of the experience of having ME. In particular, our 
analysis focused on the functions accomplished through the details of the 
descriptions produced by participants. We showed how their accounts were 
designed to address negative or otherwise problematic inferences that may 
be made about them. This is important because the rhetorical and interactive 
nature of illness accounts has been ignored in cognitive behavioural 
(Horton-Salway, 2001) and other approaches to treatment. ME sufferers’ 
descriptions of their illness have been taken at face value as evidence for 
theoretical interpretations of the cause of this condition or, according to 
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Horton-Salway (2001), as evidence of their attributions or personality. Thus, 
sufferers’ apparent preoccupation with its seriousness, or its enigmatic 
nature, has been used to support the use of CBT to change ‘dysfunctional’ 
beliefs (Wessely, 1996). Sufferers’ accounts might, however, stress the 
seriousness and mysterious nature of ME to counter claims that it is not a 
legitimate, physical illness. In other words, the kinds of assumptions built 
into common treatments for ME/CFS are just those that participants reject. 
Thus, it is not enough to treat sufferers’ descriptions as ‘mere refl ections’ of 
experience. They must be understood in the context of the inferential and 
interactional issues they are designed to address. It is therefore important 
to understand patients’ versions, and how they are built, because effective 
treatment requires the doctor to work with patients’ descriptions of their 
experiences rather than imposing their own (cf. Clements et al., 1997).
Our fi ndings are therefore in line with, but extend, those of previous stu-
dies. This is signifi cant because, as explained above, one of our primary aims 
was to compare data from different sources in order to assess the utility of 
the internet as a research tool. So, in this study, data were collected from two 
sources: face-to-face group discussions among members of a support group 
and questions answered via an internet chatroom and personal e-mails. 
In the analysis, we made no prior distinction between data from different 
sources. Instead, we let any similarities and differences emerge through our 
subsequent inspection of our analytic fi ndings. Let us now, then, assess the 
use of these different methods.
We have observed that the devices and interactional concerns identifi ed 
were manifest in both internet and face-to-face group data. For example, 
we found the use of listing, vivid description and analogy, and reference 
to a ‘reliable witness’ in both types of data. Of course, there were some 
minor differences in the details of production due to the different media. 
In the face-to-face group, listing was accomplished collaboratively within 
sequences of turns. By contrast, in the internet data, line breaks and 
grammatical omissions were used to create lists. There was also an absence 
of pauses, hesitancy markers and so on in the written communication.
Moreover, the themes that emerged were similar, suggesting that 
participants were attending to the same kinds of interactional concerns. In one 
sense, this is perhaps not surprising. Most of the e-mail correspondence was 
done via a chatline in which correspondents’ responses were simultaneously 
emailed to other members of the group and even the personal e-mails were 
addressed to another person (the fi rst author). Therefore, all the data were 
provided in a context of some level of social interaction, and the fact that 
we have observed participants addressing the inferential implications of 
their accounts indicates that they were sensitive to this context.
The internet is therefore a fruitful means of collecting data which has 
further practical advantages for research with people who suffer debilitating 
fatigue, among other problems. Moreover, by using computer-aided com-
munication, access could be available to people over a wide geographic 
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area, some of whom may be housebound and might not otherwise have 
been able to participate in research (or in support groups).
Previous studies have not attended to the internet as a domain for 
interactions and support among sufferers. This study goes some way 
to remedying this omission. This is important because sufferers often 
experience reduced opportunities for everyday social interactions. In 
extreme cases, the severity of the problem may even mean that sufferers are 
denied the opportunity to attend face-to-face peer group support meetings 
or to engage fully with therapeutic services. In this sense, sufferers are faced 
with problems of social exclusion from the very groups and services which 
in principle could provide them with support.References
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